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Abstract
Mental imagery has been associated with many cognitive functions, both high and low-level. Despite recent scientific
advances, the contextual and environmental conditions that most affect the mechanisms of visual imagery remain unclear.
It has been previously shown that the greater the level of background luminance the weaker the effect of imagery on
subsequent perception. However, in these experiments it was unclear whether the luminance was affecting imagery
generation or storage of a memory trace. Here, we report that background luminance can attenuate both mental imagery
generation and imagery storage during an unrelated cognitive task. However, imagery generation was more sensitive to the
degree of luminance. In addition, we show that these findings were not due to differential dark adaptation. These results
suggest that afferent visual signals can interfere with both the formation and priming-memory effects associated with visual
imagery. It follows that background luminance may be a valuable tool for investigating imagery and its role in various
cognitive and sensory processes.
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Introduction
It has been proposed that mental imagery is akin to perception
in the absence of external stimulation, a product of sensory
information retrieved from memory [1]. It is often referred to as
seeing with the mind’s eye, hearing with the mind’s ear, or feeling
with the mind’s skin [2]. We use imagery on a daily basis during
high-level cognitive tasks such as navigation, spatial planning, or
even to remember a friend’s face [1,3]. It has also been proposed
that mental imagery contributes to memory storage and retrieval
[1]. Mental imagery has even been used as an effective tool in
cognitive therapy and for improving motor abilities through
mental practice [4,5,6].
An ongoing debate in the literature is whether mental imagery
involves pictorial low-level mechanisms, or whether it is symbolic
in a similar vein to language, and thus a more high-level
mechanism [1,7]. Evidence for it being pictorial in nature comes
from research showing that mental imagery is processed
retinotopically [8,9]. These researchers found that two-thirds of
brain activity observed during mental imagery was also activated
during visual perception. Furthermore fMRI studies of visual
imagery have shown that, as with normal vision, the brain areas
activated depend on the type of object being visualised [8,10]. In
addition, behavioural methods have been used to investigate the
nature of imagery [11,12,13,14], and produced strong evidence for
its similarity with visual perception.
Pylyshyn (1973) on the other hand, suggested that imagery is not
pictorial in nature but rather represented and stored by propositions
in the same way as semantic information is represented by its
relationship with other concepts. In this scenario the observed
similarities between imagery and perception might simply be due to
our ability to compose imagery in a way that resembles perception,
not because they are inherently similar processes [7,15].
Strong evidence that imagery involves mechanisms in early
visual processing comes from an empirical method developed by
Pearson, Clifford and Tong (2008) in which imagery was used to
bias subsequent binocular rivalry. Binocular rivalry refers to the
fluctuations in visual awareness that result from displaying two
different patterns, one to each eye. When participants were cued
to imagine one of the rivalry patterns, imagery tended to prime
subsequent perception of rivalry. The pattern a subject saw during
the rivlary presentation tended to be the pattern they had
imagined a few seconds earlier. In addition, it was shown that this
priming was orientation specific, that is, for this bias to occur,
imagery had to be at the same angular orientation as the rivalry
patterns. This work sugests that visual imagery involves low-level
mechanisms that overlap with visual perception [16].
Pearson et al. (2008) also showed that the higher the level of
background luminance during the binocular rivalry task, the
weaker the effect of imagery on subsequent perception. This
suggests that the general level of background luminance can
attenuate imagery’s effect on subsequent perception. When using
binocular rivalry to investigate imagery, to avoid any confounding
effects of visual attention on perception, the authors always
separated imagery and perception in time. It is well known that
visual attention can change the perceived characteristics of a visual
stimulus [17]. Separating imagery and perception in time
introduces a memory trace between imagery generation and the
binocular rivalry test stimulus. Hence, in the above study it was
unclear if the luminance of the background was attenuating
imagery generation, the memory trace, or both.
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between imagery and the rivalry task. It is known to last several
seconds [12], therefore outside the realms of iconic memory,
which only lasts for up to around 500 ms [18,19]. Additionally, the
memory for imagery is automatic unlike visual spatial working
memory, which typically requires active maintenance [20,21].
This memory seems to be more akin to the memory during
perceptual priming as it is specific to the features and location of
the stimulus being imagined [12,22,23].
In the current study we report that background luminance can
attenuate both mental imagery generation and storage of the
imagery trace. However, imagery generation seems to be more
sensitive to luminance, as lower levels of luminance had greater
effects on generation compared to the memory trace. In addition,
when luminance was presented between experimental trials




Thirteen undergraduate psychology students completed all
conditions of the first two experiments. An additional nine
participants were screened who did not meet a criterion of
imagery priming above 50% (=.51% bias as measured by the
rivalry task in the no luminance condition). The criterion was
implemented in order to exclude participants with very weak
imagery, indicated by a lack of priming in the binocular rivalry
task. For this study we were interested in how background
luminance would attenuate processes associated with imagery.
Hence, we required subjects who displayed a moderate or high
level of imagery in the dark no luminance condition. Fourteen
participants took part in the third experiment, with four who did
not meet the above criterion. Subjects gave informed written
consent before participating in the experiment, and received
payment for participation in the form of course credit. The local
Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel (Psychology) at The
University of New South Wales approved this study.
Pre-experiment Tests
The stimuli were red and green sinusoid luminance modulated
oriented gratings. The contrast of the stimulus was applied to a
Gaussian-windowed mean luminance profile (spatial frequency 1.6
cycles/u, Gaussian =2.6u), which had a mean luminance of 4 cd/
m
2. These oriented patterns had an internal contrast of ,60% in
relation to the average luminance of the stimulus only, as the
surrounding background was black. The red grating pattern
comprised of a CIE of x=.277, y=0.613 with a horizontal
orientation, presented to the left eye. The green vertical pattern
(CIE of x=0.601, y=0.368) was presented to the right eye. Both
patterns were presented in an annulus around a bullseye fixation
spot 0.5u in diameter.
In order to minimize potential eye bias, an initial task was
completed to determine the correct balance of stimulus contrasts
between the two rivalry patterns. The contrast of the gratings had
to be adjusted for each participant in order to account for
individual differences in eye dominance and bias. In order to
determine these contrasts, the same procedure was used as in
previous studies see [12]. This procedure involves exposing
participants to an intervening perceptual stimulus (one of the
rivalry patterns) that acted to adapt or fatigue the neurons
representing a particular pattern. This procedure has been
previously used successfully to attain equivalent functional
strengths between the two rivalry patterns.
This eye bias procedure involved each subject being presented
with the rivalry patterns, in isolation (just one pattern) and
subsequently together undergoing rivalry. Each of the isolated
presentations lasted 4 seconds. Not only did this procedure allow
us to equalize the pattern strengths, it also provided an
opportunity for subjects to familiarize themselves with each of
the patterns they would subsequently be required to imagine. In
addition, before experimental trials were allowed to continue
subjects were shown hard copy color printouts of each grating
pattern and verbally asked if they felt familiar enough with each
pattern to perform mental imagery of that pattern. Participants
were asked to imagine the patterns as best they could and if
possible to imagine the color, spatial frequency, size and location
in visual space of the pattern.
All conditions of the experiment were conducted in a darkened
room (0 cd/m
2 reflectance off a white surface) with black walls, on
a calibrated (190 Philip Brilliance 109P4) monitor with a resolution
of 12806960 and a refresh rate of 75 Hz. The experiment was run
in MatLab and the Psychophysics toolbox [24,25] on a Mac Mini
computer.
Main Experiment
In the first experiment participants were randomly cued to
imagine one of the binocular rivalry patterns for 10 seconds. ‘‘R’’
was the cue for the red horizontal grating and ‘‘G’’ for the green
vertical grating (see figure 1a). During the imagery period one of
four different background luminance levels was presented. These
varied from 0% (black screen), 25%, 50% and 100% of the mean
luminance and colour of the two rivalry patterns (4 cd/m
2). These
conditions were run in blocked sets of experimental trials. The
background luminance ramped on and off smoothly over 500 ms
to avoid visual transients.
Following imagery generation, participants completed a rapid
serial visual presentation task (RSVP) in which random letters
were presented on the screen for a five second period, displayed
for 300 ms each. Behind each letter was a small Gaussian patch of
luminance matching the background in the 100% background
luminance condition, this remained the same in all conditions.
This was to maintain consistency in the letter task throughout all
conditions. Participants were required to press the ‘‘C’’ or ‘‘V’’ key
as soon as either letter was presented on the screen. The RSVP
task was included as a distracter task to ensure that participants
stopped imagining the stimulus at the required time. This task also
ensured that any influence on rivalry was not due to an attentional
effect as the participants had to apply their attention to the RSVP
task. This was lastly followed by a binocular rivalry display for 0.75
seconds. Participants indicated the dominant pattern using 3
different keys, either ‘‘1’’ green, ‘‘2’’ for a mixed percept or ‘‘3’’ for
the red pattern. The trials in which participants reported seeing a
mixed percept were discarded from the analysis. If a subject
reported a mixed percept on more than 20% of trials they were
dropped from further analysis.
There were at least 60 trials for each level of background
luminance for each subject. Each block of 60 trials lasted for ,20
minutes. In addition, ten practice trials were completed before
testing began.
The second experiment was otherwise the same, however, the
luminance backgrounds were presented during the RSVP letter
task, rather than during imagery generation (see figure 2a). A final
experiment was conducted with a separate group of participants in
order to test for any influence of dark adaptation, as the change in
the sensitivity due to long periods in the dark could potentially
influenced the interaction between imagery and binocular rivalry
perception. In this experiment the four levels of background
Incoming Luminance Signals Disrupt Visual Imagery
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seconds (see figure 3a). Furthermore, the order of conditions and
luminance levels was pseudo-randomized in all experiments.
Results
Experiment One: Imagery Generation
Experiment 1, examined the effect of different levels of
luminance during the imagery generation period. Figure 1b shows
the data from experiment 1. In the no luminance condition
(leftmost column) imagery primed the dominant percept in the
subsequent rivalry presentation in 63% of trials. Whereas in the
25, 50 and 100% luminance conditions imagery only primed
rivalry dominance ,55%, showing an overall effect of luminance
(F(1,12)=7.2, p=0.001). The 25, 50 and 100% conditions did not
significantly differ from the chance score of 50%, (lowest
p=0.178), but were all significantly different from the dark 0%
condition (highest p=0.01).
Experiment Two: Imagery Storage
In experiment 2 we examined how imagery’s ability to prime
rivalry was influenced by different levels of background
luminance during the storage period in which subjects performed
the letter detection task. The results of experiment 2 are shown
in Figure 2b. Imagery priming decreased as the intensity of
the background luminance increased. In the 25% luminance
condition imagery primed rivalry dominance in 60% of trials,
while in the 50% and 100% luminance condition imagery primed
rivalry around 53% of trials. There was a significant main effect
of luminance during the storage period, on rivalry priming
(F(1,12)=6.698 p=0.001).
Unlike experiment one, here the 25% luminance condition was
not significantly different from the dark 0% condition (t=21.358,
p=0.199), and was significantly different from chance 50%
(t=2.753, p=0.017). Suggesting the memory trace of imagery is
less sensitive to background luminance as compared to the
imagery generation process.
Experiment Three: Dark Adaptation
The current study was conducted in the dark the majority of
time and it is known that dark adaptation occurs after a period of
time in darkness [26,27]. In experiment one and two, participants
were exposed to luminance during different periods of an
experimental trial. Luminance during both the generation and
storage periods affected imagery’s ability to prime subsequent
rivalry, albeit somewhat differently. To investigate the possibility
that exposure to luminance at any time period in close temporal
proximity to imagery might attenuate its effects on subsequent
vision, we ran an experiment in which we manipulated the
luminance between experimental trials. The luminance between
each experimental trial could be one of either 0%, 25%, 50% or
100% background luminance.
Figure 1. Experiment one: The effect of luminance on imagery generation. (A) Time-line showing the different phases of a trial and the
rivalry stimuli. First the letter cue, presented on a black background indicates the pattern to imagine. The background during the imagery task is
illuminated, at 0, 25, 50 or 100% of the mean luminance of the rivalry patterns, followed by a 5 second long letter discrimination task and then the
rivalry display. (B) The percentage of trials in which the dominant rivalry pattern matched the imagery cue, grouped by luminance of the background.
Note that priming of 50% indicates chance. The error bars show the standard error of the mean (SEM). N=13.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015217.g001
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significant effect of luminance across the different conditions
(F(1,13)=.761, p=.523). This data suggests that the effect of
luminance in the previous experiments was immediate and local in
time.
RSVP Letter Task
There was no significant correlation between the performance
on the RSVP letter task and imagery priming (R=0.264, p=0.26).
In addition, there was no significant effect of luminance on the
RSVP task scores in either experiment one (F=1.28, p=.3) or two
(F=.820, p=.5).
Discussion
The results of the current study indicate that both imagery
generation and imagery storage can be attenuated by background
luminance. This finding is consistent with the results of Pearson
et al. (2008), who showed that forming a mental image and storing
it in the presence of an illuminated screen results in weaker effects
on subsequent perception. Furthermore, imagery generation
seems to be more sensitive to luminance than imagery storage,
as even the lowest amount of background luminance during
imagery generation caused a significant decrease in imagery
priming. The lowest level of background luminance, on the other
hand, did not significantly disrupt the imagery memory trace. In
addition, these results do not appear to be due to the general
presence of luminance outside the trial sequence.
Various explanations could be proposed to account for the
effect of luminance on imagery. As the luminance ramped on
slowly and remained constant until the end of the designated time
period, it seems unlikely that the presence of luminance simply
distracted subjects from performing the imagery task or led to
increased perceptual load [28]. In addition, the presence of
luminance had no significant effect on performance in the letter
detection task.
Both afferent visual signals originating from the illuminated
background and the neural response related to imagery can
involve activity in early visual areas [9,12,29,30]. One proposition
is that activity in these early visual areas might have plateaued due
to the incoming luminance based signals. If this were the case, the
addition of any top-down neural activity due to imagery may have
a negligible net effect on the absolute level of neural firing eg. a
ceiling effect.
Experimental participants here, and in previous studies [12]
often commented that forming a mental image somehow felt more
difficult in bright illuminated environments. In fact, the absence of
incoming visual signals has been associated with hyper-imagery
ability [31]. Interestingly, dynamic visual noise has been shown to
influence spatial imagery tasks [32] and also visual spatial working
memory tasks [33]. Recent work has demonstrated that the
presence of task irrelevant visual displays can even interfere with
long-term memory retrieval [34].
The affects of dynamic visual noise have been used to illustrate
commonalities between visual spatial working memory systems
and visual imagery [32,33]. In fact, the degree of vividness of
Figure 2. Experiment two: The effect of luminance on imagery storage. (A) The time-line, here was the same as that is experiment one, with
the exception that the different levels of background luminance were shown during imagery storage (letter task). (B) The percentage of trials in
which participants were primed by imagery grouped by luminance of the background during the letter task/storage period. The error bars show the
standard error of the mean (SEM). N=13.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0015217.g002
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visual spatial working memory system [35,36,37]. However, it
remains to be seen if the degree of background luminance can be
utilised to untangle the seemingly intricate relationship between
visual imagery and visual spatial components of working memory.
It is worth noting that in previous work [12], the degree of
background luminance while attenuating the effects of visual
imagery did not systematically alter the affects of visual attention.
The results of the present study may support the pictorial nature
of imagery. Luminance was able to disrupt imagery generation,
and since luminance and imagery both activate early visual areas,
it could be suggested that this interaction is occurring in early
visual areas known to process visual stimuli and imagery in a
pictorial/retinotopic manner [9,30,38].
Given that imagery generation is more sensitive than storage to
luminance, it is possible that the cognitive process implicated in
storage is actually different to that during generation. Therefore,
imagery may engage two separate mechanisms, one for imagery
generation and another for imagery storage. The nature of this
imagery memory trace is yet to be fully explored. However, one
possibility is that the memory involved in imagery is similar to
perceptual memory, particularly perceptual priming [23]. In
Pearson et al (2008), visual imagery was shown to have a similar
influence on binocular rivalry as weak visual stimulation,
suggesting that the memory traces involved in imagery and
perception might be a part of the same memory system. Evidence
suggests that this type of perceptual memory is most probably
stored in early stages of processing in the visual cortex [23] and
therefore the memory trace for visual imagery may also be stored
within similar areas of the visual cortex.
This study shows that visual imagery can be attenuated by
afferent visual signals and therefore imagery can be most
effectively utilized and examined in dark environments. This has
implications for future studies that aim at investigating the nature
of imagery and its roll in cognitive functioning. Furthermore, the
current data suggest the existence of two partially separable
mechanisms associated with imagery, one for generation and one
for storage. This memory mechanism for imagery resembles the
processes underlying perceptual memory. However, the full extent
of any mechanistic overlap is an interesting topic for future studies.
We hope that the manipulation of afferent visual signals could be a
valuable investigative tool giving traction to future studies of
mental imagery.
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